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METHODS SUPPORTING FIRE RISK ASSESSMENT AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Abstract: Fire risks may be described using a probabilistic approach to take account for the 
uncertainties in the description of scenarios. This is different from a pure deterministic 
approach using models that predict precise outcomes based on a set of defined input data.. 
There are different philosophies to describe fire risks as the frequentist approach relaying on 
failure statistics of e.g. components or the Bayesian Believe Networks. More recently 
approaches to better describe the dynamic behavior of systems are being developed. These 
models are used to establish the essential information for risk informed decision support. 
They are further useful to design the proper fire risk management for the respective systems 
that goes beyond the risk assessment and includes maintenance of safety barriers.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Objective and scope of lecture 
Performance based fire safety engineering is a valuable method to assess fire risks. It is 
a scientific based alternative to prescriptive assessments. The performance based approach 
is relying on a number of deterministic and probabilistic models such as fire plume models, 
ignition models, fire spread models, evacuation time models, event trees, fault trees, 
Bayesian networks to predict the required and available safe egress times. These are ranging 
from engineering correlations and simplified models to CFD models and Monte Carlo type 
calculations. All types are important: for the assessment of very detailed scenarious the CFD 
approach will provide the best results, but on the cost of calculation and interpretation time. 
The simplified models allow to predict a great number of scenarious that can be extended 
to Monte Carlo type of modelling to establish a good overview on the important scenarious 
as they are fast calculating but on the cost of details. to predict systems and systems safety 
2. FRAMEWORK FOR BUILDING FIRE SAFETY 
2.1. The IRCC- hierachy  
The IRCC has developped an 8 tier approach for a fire engineering strategy as reported 
by Meacham (Meacham 2010), decribed below. It describes a hierachy of fire safety 
measurese to protect people and structures in case of a fire event. It emphases the protection 
of people in accordance with the use of the specific building.  
• tier 1 Goal (safety): provide an environment reasonbly free from injury and death 
o Buildings shall provide occupants with a reasonable level of safety from 
natural and technological hazards 
• tier 2 Functional statement (fire / life safety)  
o Provide appropriate measures to protect occupants not intimate with the 
initial materials burning from the negative effects of unwanted fire. 
• tier 3 Operative requirement 
o Means of egress shall be designed such that occupants not intimate with the 
initial materials burning are provided with adequate time to reach a place 
of safety without being unreasonably exposed to untenable conditions 
resulting from the fire. 
• tier 4 Performance / Risk groups 
o Performance/ Risk groups (e.g. PGI, PGII, PGIII, PGIV). These regard: a) 
Primary uses(s) of the building, general building characteristics, etc.; b) 
Importance of the building; c) Occupant risk charcteristics as associated 
with the primary use(s) of the building; d) Type of hazard event and 
magnitude of hazard event the building and occupants are expected to 
withstand (design loads) 
• tier 5 Performance levels 
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o Performance levels ( Levels of tolerable impact (e.g. mild, moderate, high 
, severe) 
• tier 6 Performance criteria 
• tier 7 & 8 Solution and verification verification methods 
o Gas temperature; b) Thermal radiation; c) Smoke density; d) Smoke level 
above floor; e) CO level; f) Structural failure temperature 
o Herunder to establish: a) Test methods; b) Installation standards; c) 
Analytical or computational models; d) Design guides 
 
This is in accordance with the ISO definition of "Fire Safety Engineering" (see (Dansk 
Standard 2012)), as e.g. addapted in (National Research Council Canada; International Code 
Council (USA); New Zealand. Dept. of Building and Housing; Australian Building Codes 
Board 2005) (link to guidelines): 
"The application of engineering priciples, rules and expert judgement based on a 
scientific appreciation of the fire phenomena, of the effects of fire, and the reaction and 
behaviour of people, in order to: 
1. save life, protect property and preserve the environment and heritage; 
2. quantify the hazards and risk of fire and its effects; 
3. evaluate analytically the optimum protective and preventative measures 
necessary to limit, within prescribed levels, the consequences of fire" 
In order to apply fire engineering, it is necessary to understand the many aspects of building 
fires that are invetigated within the area of fire science. Herunder, it is essential to establish 
knowlegde about the ignition mechanisms of the different materials and fire develop 
including fire spread scenarious and fire chemistry. This provides the basis to predict smoke 
spread and toxic fire effluent concentrations important to know for the rescue of people. 
This knowledge is also important to determine the reaction to fire of structures. 
Furthermore, the knowledge how people respond in case of a fire, to the alarms and the 
process of evacuation is important. This is within fire science established using fire 
dynamics theory; using deterministic and probabilistic fir e behaviour and effects 
modellingt; as well as human behaviour and toxic effects modelling. Such knowledge is 
implemented into various tools to conduct performance based fire engineering in practice. 
 
3. A GENERAL ACCIDENT MODEL 
Real fire accident scenarious are often complex. In order to systemize and to support 
development of fire scenarious an accident model is presented. This accident model is based 
on the uncontrolled flow of energy (UFOE) concept and is described by (Rasmussen & 
Grønberg n.d.). The concept is considering the term energy very broadly embracing energy 
forms as for instance heat, heat radiation, mechanical energy and other forms of energy. 
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More broadly the concept additionally includes material flows and toxic substances under 
the term „energy“ (see Figure 1).  
In the normal state, the energy is controlled and any process applying the energy is 
regarded as safe. It can be said that the energy is confined by the process equipment essential 
to drive the process. For achieving a higher safety level, additional safety functions may be 
implementet that are only activated in case of an accidental event. The location where the 
energy is confined is called the hazard source. In case of an accident the confinement is 
violated. It is called a Loss of Confinemnet (LoC) situation. On LoC the energy is released 
resulting in an UFOE situation. The UFOE may expose vulnerable objects. These maybe 
people, property or environment. This model is valid for fire scenarious as well as industrial 
accidents. 
 
Figure 1 UFOE model  
Under a UFOE situation emergency support is needed. The model regards six universal 
emergency measures to prevent or mitigate exposures of the vulnerable objects. These are: 
1. move vulnerable objects: evacuate plant stuff, evacuate neighbors, stop traffic 
to ares, remove valuable objects 
2. modify energy: water curtain, sprinkling 
3. redirect flow: lead water form fire fighting away from sensitive areas, collect 
water from fire fighting (portable spill basins), build interimistic dams  
4. control source: extinguish fire, cover leak 
5. encapsulate moving energy: cover with foam 
6. establish negative source: lead spill to sewer, add chemical agents to bind 
dangerous substances 
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4. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEM 
The UFOE model shown in Figure 1 describes any accident within a socio-technical 
system. This is not only true for the emergency reponce as described above, but it is also 
true for controlling the hazardous source. Any accident is the result of a number of steps 
leading to the overall consequence of a specific accident. Besides technical errors also 
human and organisational factors are part of an accident. This is illustrated by (Svedung & 
Rasmussen 2002), where the critical event is also dependent on the organisational 
interactions withithe socio-technological sytem as shown in Figure 2. Here the LoC or 
critical event is modelled using a bow-tie representation together with the interrelation of 
staff, their management and the whole company. The national safety policy is defined and 
influenced by regulaters and branch associations and on the highest level by the government 
deciding on the necessary laws for regulation of e.g. building and infrastructure fire safety. 
Work and Hazardous Processes
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Chain of Events
Causal 
chain 2 Critical event
Causal 
chain 1
Causal 
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Root 
casue 2
Root 
cause 1
Root 
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Action
Loss of control of 
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Figure 2 Model by Rasmussen and Svedung socio-technical model of system operations (e.g. (Svedung & 
Rasmussen 2002)) 
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5. PERFORMANCE BASED FIRE SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
In order to implement the above some practical tools and approaches are to be used 
within the performance based approach. The main goal is to evacuate and to rescue people 
from any building. The basic approach to fullfill this is the ASET / RSET approach, which 
stands for "Available safe egress time" and "Required safe egress time", respectively. The 
ASET depends on the actual fire scenario, while the RSET describes the time that is 
reasonable needed to leave the fire location to a rescued area inside a large building and/or 
in front af a building. This is described as the ratio of ASET vs RSET and a value below 1 
is deemed to be a safe situation, while values close to and above 1 are describing unsafe 
situations that may cause loss of life and injuries of people. (see Figure 6) 
The RSET is the result of the inherent system safety of each building, as it is measuring 
and calculating the evacuation time on basis of the length of the evacuation paths, the 
established safety features as the detection and alarming systems, fire sprinkling, fire doors 
and other means. It takes into account a risk that parts of these safety functions are faulty 
and my not work in case of the fire situation. It could be that the location of the starting fire 
is preventing a single escape route and /or that some of the safety barriers such as the fire 
doors or detection & alarm systems do not function.  
 
Fire ignition Notification of the occupants
First movement
Towards an exit
Occupants reach
A place of safety
Untenable 
conditions
Available safe egress time
Required safe egress time
tD+W tR+R tT+Q
Detection & warning
time
Recognition & responce
time
Travel & queuing
time
RSET
ASET
 
Figure 3 Assessment of RSET vs ASET ratio  
The ASET is the result of the actual fire scenariou within a specific building. The 
available time for rescue is predicted taking into account the timely development of a fire 
as an important parameter as shown in Figure 7. The development is dependent on the initial 
materials starting the fire and the other materials near the fire location that may lead to flash 
over and fire spread. A room will be filled with smoke in a hot layer just below the ceiling. 
During the fire the hot layer will become thicker and may be the cause for a flash over 
situation when the heat radiation form this layer is growing above a threshold value. It is 
typically assumed a value of 20 kW/m2 in the Danish regulations. Any building fire will 
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furthermore devellope smoke and toxic fire emissions such as carbon monoxide that may 
spread to other parts of the building through various openings, such as open doors. 
 
 
Figure 4 Fire growth rates for different materials: 𝑄𝑄𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 =∝  𝑡𝑡2. 
(http://projects.bre.co.uk/frsdiv/designfires/NFPA.htm)  
 
6. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 
These fire phenomina mentioned above are described by various parameters as e.g. the 
tempertaure of hot upper layer, height below the upper layer, concentration of toxic gases 
and visibility in a room filled with smoke. These paramters are being calculated in the 
performance based approach and by that certain time profiles for the parameterws are 
establsihed. In order to predict critical situations e.g. situations where the visibility loss 
prevents proper evacuation or where the temperature is becomming to heigh for humans to 
escape a set of threshold criteria are established. The ASET is therefore defined as the time 
until the first threshold is reached comparing all criteria, i.a. the ASET is defined as the 
shortest time to reach one of the threshold criteria. These criteria are often reported as 
tenability or harm criteria to people in the wider literature and these are (see also Figure 9):  
• Heat release rate ,  
• smoke layer (temperature, toxicity, height);  
• visibility;  
• heat radiation,  
• etc. 
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Figure 5 selected harm criteria to people using a performance based fire risk assessment, as established in the 
Danish guidelines "Information om brandsikkerhed af bygninger" ((The Danish Government 2010)). 
 
By that the ASET is determined and using e.g. evacuation flow models and the former 
predicted RSET, the number of people at risk may be determined. This is with benefit done 
using a probabilistic approach as many parameters as the fire loads, the location of the initial 
fire, the functioning of the fire safety barriers (such as detectors, alarms, fire doors, fire 
ventialtion, etc.) are of stochastic nature. This may be modelled by probabilistic methods as 
e.g. Bayesian networks or using event trees (see Figure 13 and fault trees (Figure 14).  
 
Figure 6 example for FN -curve 
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A risk based approach will predict an overall probability taking into account the 
consequences on people, such as lethallity. For the final evaluation of the building or 
infrastructure safety the risk may be expressed as the individual risk (the risk that an 
unprotected person at a certain location is lethally affected by the accident. Another measure 
is the societal risks that includes the population around the accident location. The latter is 
usually presented in form of FN diagrams (see Figure 8).  
 
7. QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE FIRE RISK ASSESSMENT 
A fire risk assessment is done in several steps as shown in Figure 7. The important very 
first step is to collect information on the regarded system and to get familiar with it in the 
systems analysis. The risk assessment afterwards combines qualitative hazard identification 
and hazard & scenario analysis with deterministic prediction of the consequences and 
probabilistic description of the likelihood of the different accident scenarious to happen.  
 
 
Figure 7 Steps in a fire risk assessment 
Based on the likelihood and the consequences, the risk for a specific fire accident may 
be calculated. The risk is defined as the product of the likelihood of the events times the 
consequence of the fire scenario.  
In order to evaluate the risk, risk accepteance criteria are to be established. The risks and 
the risk acceptance criteria are compared and when the risks are below the risk acceptance  
these with the calculated risk leads to decisions on the acceptability of a given scenario.  
 
  
Knowledge FOr Resilient soCiEty K-FORCE     
10 
 
The results of the risk assessment provides valuable input for safety management 
strategies in order to establish and maintaine the requested saftey level.  
 
7.1. Hazard identification methods 
 
Figure 8 an example fire scenario 
In order to predict fire risks the system has to be defined and typical fire scenarios have 
to be found, as in the example shown in Figure 4. There are numerous qualitative and 
quantititave methods to assess such scenarious. The application of these may be different as 
a simple checklist maybe efficient and suitable for standard systems. A HazOP is good to 
analyse for hazards in flow systems and needs the setup of an expert group that discusses 
the details of the regarded systems. Similar for FMEA analyses, but the tool is best to find 
possible hazards on a component level. FTA is excellent to find the root course behind a 
possible initiating fire event or the reason why e.g. a sprinkler system does not work on 
demand. The ETA is good to analyse the progress of an initial event (the critical event from 
the FTA analysis) and predict the out come of e.g. an evacuation scenario taking into 
account the functioning or malfunctioning of doors and other fire safety installations and 
procedurees. The Bow tie analysis is basically a combination of the FTA and the ETA, while 
the Safety barrier diagrams are an excellent extension of these, as it provides a more simple 
representation of the scenarious and is focussing on the safety barriers. Some common 
methods are: 
• Checklists – good for well defined systems 
• HAZOP - Hazard and Operability Study  - good to find hazards in a flow system 
• FMEA -  Failure Modes and Effects Analysis – good to find hazards by 
components 
• FTA -  Fault Tree Analysis – good to analyse for the root cause of failures 
• ETA -  Event Tree Analysis –good to analyse the progression of events 
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• Safety Barrier diagrams- good to analyse the appropriateness of safety barriers (see 
Figure 5) 
• Bow-tie- combination of FTA and ETA (see Figure 6 and e.g. (Hakobyan et al. 
2008; Salvi & Debray 2006)) 
 
Figure 9 Example for an Safety Barrier diagram for a warehouse fire scenario 
 
Figure 10 The Bow tie diagramm 
7.1.1. Event trees 
Event trees ET are very common in fire safety engineering and maybe used to describe 
found fire scenarious as indicated in Figure 10. A ET (see Figure 13) is modelling the events 
that are following a starting fire and easily can include working or not working states for 
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detection, alarms, sprinklers and other. It is also possible to include probabilities or 
frequencies for each event and therefore it is possible to calculate the probability of each 
resulting scenario. 
 
Figure 11 Event tree based on fire scenario defiend in Figure 4 
7.1.2. Fault trees 
Fault trees FT (see Figure 14) are modelling the causes that may result in the critical 
event as e.g. “the fire protection system fails”. FT are often used to find root causes of such 
critical events and therefore are describing and enable to calculate the probability of such 
events. An FT is broken down in sub causes until the root causes are found. It uses logical 
AND or OR gates and this enables to calculate the probability of the critical events just 
knowing the failure frequency of the root causes.  
7.1.3. Bayesian Beliefe networks 
Probabilistic assessment uses many different methods. The above described ET and FT 
methods are often used by the frequentists, as the quantification requires statistical data. 
Another and increasingly popular method is the Bayesian believe networks BBN that may  
predict a probability of events using the concept of the believe. It is different from the 
frequentist approach. This concept is subject to another lecture. 
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Figure 12 Example of a fault tree of a sprinkler system 
8. STATIC VS. DYNAMIC METHODS 
The above mentioned models are to be considered as static methods as they do not take 
into account dynamic changes. These are lumped into average. An introduction of dynamics 
is difficult, but would be valuable to predict failures and consequences of dynamic 
interdependent systems (Duijm et al. 2013; Frank Markert et al. 2016; F. Markert et al. 
2016). The term "dynamic risk assessment", is interpreted differently ((Hakobyan et al. 
2008):  
• Methods for periodic updates of an Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) to address 
any changes in a plant configuration  
• Updates to account for the ageing of equipment 
• Approaches that include explicit deterministic modelling of dynamic processes 
combined with stochastic modelling to describe a systems evolution.  
 
Figure 13 dynamic approach with mutual dependent sub-scenarious 
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9. UNCERTAINTIES 
Any determistic and probabilistic assessment will contain some uncertainties. General 
speaking these uncertainties can be divided into aleatory and epistemic uncertainties. The 
aleatory uncertainties are describing the inherent variations associated with a physical 
system, as e.g. weather parameters at a certain point of time and space. These are 
unavoidable. The epistemic uncertainties are caused by an incomplete understanding of the 
system. This may be caused because the system or building is newapplying new nt 
sufficiently tested materials are combinations of these. As epistemic uncertainty is caused 
by a lack of knowledge this type of uncertainty may be reduced by increasing the knowledge 
of teh regarded system. In a real world situation the risk assessments usually will include a 
combination of aleatory and epistemic uncertainties in the results.  
Tabel 1 Uncertainties found in fire modelling  
Aleatory uncertainty Epistemic uncertainty 
It describes the inherent variation 
associated with the physical system or 
the environment under consideration.  
It derives from some level of 
ignorance, or incomplete 
information about the system / the 
surrounding environment. 
Other equivalent terms: 
• stochastic uncertainty 
(variability) 
• irreducible uncertainty 
• inherent uncertainty 
• subjective 
uncertainty 
• reducible uncertainty 
• model form 
uncertainty 
Real fire risk assessment problems typically embraces both types of uncertainty. 
For management purposes accidents are ranked semi quantitaive with help of a tarfic 
light graph as shown in Figure 14. The accidents with acceptable risk (probaility of 
occurance times consequence) will be found in the green area , while unaccepatble risk will 
be shown in the red area. There is defined a yellow area were the technology may be 
acceptable when the systems provides a risk as low as practical possible ALARP. This 
principal is used to e.g. decide on further safety barriers and may be comparing the cost for 
these measures and the costs resulting form the consequences of an accident. 
 
In Figure 15 the traffic light graph is additional indicating areas of uncertainties as 
investigated by (Renn & Klinke 2004). They found a number of clusters which are 
detrmined by there uncertainty in the risk both due to the uncertainty on the consequence 
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and the probability that an accident may occur. This is further explained in Table 1 together 
with three different types of maangement strategies to cope with the different situations. 
 
Figure 14 traffic light graph to indicate the acceptability of risks 
 
 
Figure 15 traffic light graph including types of uncertainty after (Renn & Klinke 2004) 
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Table 1 management strategies in relation to the recognized uncertainties 
Management Risk class 
Extent of 
damage 
Probability of 
occurrence 
Strategies for action 
Science-based 
Damocles 
Cyclops 
High 
High 
Low 
Uncertain 
•Reducing disaster 
potential 
•Ascertaining 
probability 
•Increasing resilience 
•Preventing surprises 
•Emergency 
management 
Precautionary 
Pythia 
Pandora 
Uncertain 
Uncertain 
Uncertain 
Uncertain 
•Implementing 
precautionary 
principle 
•Developing 
substitutes 
•Improving 
knowledge 
•Reduction and 
containment 
•Emergency 
management 
Discursive 
Cassandra 
Medusa 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
•Consciousness 
building 
•Confidence building 
•Public participation 
•Risk communication 
•Contingency 
management 
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10. MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
Table 1 shows three mangement strategies depending on the uncertainty in the results of 
the risk assessment. The authors Renn and Klinke suggest an scientifc technical based 
management approach for situations were the system is well defined and the uncertainties 
are low or uncertain with respect to the occurance and high on the expected damage 
resulting from the consequences. For a situation were accidents resulting from a highly 
needed technology are giving high damage and also are occuring with a high probability, it 
is suggested to have a discursive management approach in order to have a public 
participation of the needs for this technology and an appropriate risk communication. Such 
a discursive management approach is also suggested in case of technologis that fully are 
acceptable with low damage and low probability of occurance, but where the public still has 
many doubts on the safety of the technology. In cases of new technologies where the 
knowledge is immature to estimate the degree of damage and the frequency of occurance a 
precautionary management approach is suggested. 
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